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This paper addresses the impact of developments in the credit risk transfer market on the 
viability of a group of systemically important financial institutions. We propose a bank 
default risk model, in the vein of the classic Merton-type, which utilizes a multi-equation 
framework to model forward-looking measures of market and credit risk using the credit 
default swap (CDS) index market as a measure of the global credit environment. In the first 
step, we establish the existence of significant detrimental volatility spillovers from the CDS 
market to the banks’  equity  prices, suggesting a credit shock propagation channel which 
results in serious deterioration of the valuation of banks’ assets. In the second step, we show 
that substantial capital injections are required to restore the stability of the banking system to 
an acceptable level after shocks to the CDX and iTraxx indices. Our empirical evidence thus 
informs the relevant regulatory authorities on the magnitude of banking systemic risk jointly 
posed by CDS markets. 
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In 2007-2008 the global nancial system has undergone a period of unprecedented in-
stability. The dierence, however, between past nancial crises and that which appears
to have begun in earnest in August 2007 is the presence of the credit derivatives (CDs)
market. The transmission of credit risk via these types of instruments appears, according
to international nancial regulators, to have amplied the global nancial crisis by oering
a direct and unobstructed mechanism for channelling defaults among a variety of types of
nancial institutions. Whilst the causes of this crisis are fairly well recognized, the mecha-
nism of transmission of shocks between CDs markets and the banking sector is not so well
understood from an empirical perspective. In fact, the academic and practitioner literature
have not yet reached rm conclusions on the nancial stability implications of credit default
swaps (CDSs) instruments.
The turbulences experienced during the crisis on OTC derivatives markets have prompted
regulators to nd solutions to enhance the smooth functioning of these markets. It is crystal
clear that in a context of inadequate underwriting practices in the US subprime mortgage
markets and excessive granting of loans by non regulated entities, nancial innovation based
on CDs was at the heart of the nancial crisis.
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the mechanisms involved in banking
stability by studying the credit default swap (CDS) index market during the 2005-2010
period and exploring how negative shocks aected nancial institutions as the subprime
crisis of 2007 unfolded and then evolved into the global nancial crisis of 2008. To explore
this issue, we address empirically the relationship between CDS index markets and the
viability of systemically important nancial institutions.
We use a contingent claims approach, which explicitly integrates forward looking market
information and recursive econometric techniques to track the evolution of default risk for
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2a sample of 16 large complex nancial institutions (LCFIs). We adopt the classic distance
to default (henceforth D-to-D) to the pricing of corporate debt. The well known market
based credit risk model is the Merton (1974) model, which views a rm's equity liability as
a call option on asset with exercise price equals its total debt liability. By backing out asset
values and volatilities from quoted stock prices and balance sheet information, the Merton
(1974) model is able to generate updates of rms' default probabilities. Since one of the
most important determinant of CDS prices is the likelihood of the reference entity involves
in a credit event, and this likelihood is tightly linked to stock market valuation as indicated
in the Merton (1974) theoretical framework, it is natural to investigate empirically the link
between the stock market and CDS markets.
A priori, it is not clear whether and to what extent CDS indices and LCFIs equity values
are related. We are not aware of any studies analyzing this relationship either theoretically
or empirically. There is a considerable volume of literature that attempts to describe the
eect of CDS on asset prices. Most of this literature relates to the co-movement of the CDS
market, the bond market and the equity market. However, to our knowledge, the closest
precursor to our analysis is the research by Bystrom (2005, 2006) and Longsta (2010).
Bystrom (2004) nds a linkage between equity prices, equity return volatilities and CDS
spreads throughout studying a set of data from the European iTraxx CDS indices and stock
indexes.
Longsta (2010) nds that during the subprime crisis of 2007, the value of asset-backed
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (using the ABX index as proxy) had a strong pre-
diction power for stock market returns (using the S&P 500 and the S&P 500 nancial
subindex as proxies). He demonstrates empirically that the ABX indices were signalling
critical information of market distress by as much as three weeks ahead and he nds strong
evidence supporting a contagion mechanism - from the ABS subprime market to other -
nancial markets - driven primarily by market premia and liquidity channels instead of the
correlated-information channel. Although his data is limited to the period between 2006
and 2008 and the results focus only on the subprime crisis of 2007, the study is a highly
valuable contribution as it sheds light on the potential correlation between the ABX index
3market and other nancial markets (in primis, the equity market for nancial institutions).
Our paper makes three distinctive contributions. The rst contribution is a new approach
to modelling banking fragility that explicitly incorporates the transmission of corporate
credit risk from the CDS index market. Our model thus contributes to the existing literature
on credit risk models and measures of systemic risk by exploring the intuition that CD premia
are univariate timely indicators of information pertinent to systemic risks. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the rst to combine the D-to-D analytical prediction of individual
banking fragility with measures of CD markets instability. While applications of the D-to-D
methodology have so far mostly concentrated in the option pricing literature, we show that
the Merton approach can be applied to the area of CRT. Hence, we provide a readable
implementable empirical application to infer default probabilities and credit risk (or other
tail behavior) on individual LCFIs.
To this purpose, we utilize a multivariate ARCH model to forecast the future volatility
of banks assets conditioned on the co-evolution of banks equity and the CDs market. The
incorporation of uncertainty and asset volatility are important elements in risk analysis since
uncertain changes in future asset values relative to promised payments on debt obligations
ultimately drive default risk and credit spreads - important elements of credit risk analysis
and, further, systemic risk (IMF, 2009). The econometric framework allows testing for the
predictive contribution of developments in the CD market on the stability of the banking
sector as depicted by the D-to-D of major nancial institutions.
The paper includes a section that sets out the possible links between the value of banks
equity and the CDS market. The basic idea is that as banks deliberately undertake risky
projects that embed counter party risk the value and volatility of the banks assets will
co-evolve with developments in CDS markets.
In the same section we outline the econometric methodology we employ for the calculation
of the probability of default for the 16 institutions in our sample. We have opted for
a mixture of MV-GARCH model and Monte Carlo simulations instead of a multivariate
stochastic volatility model. We believe that this is a rather robust approach as it allows
us to obtain the empirical distribution of volatilities, based on the dynamic structure given
4by the MV-GARCH model, and subsequently compute the probability of default when the
actual volatility is not known but its frequency distribution can be computed. A full account
of the methodology is presented in the paper.
The impact of developments in the CD market on the asset volatility is captured by
the evolution of the corporate investment-grade CDS indices (CDX and the iTraxx). CDX
North-American is the brand-name for the family of CDS index products of a portfolio
consisting of 5-year default swaps, covering equal principal amounts of debt of each of 125
named North American investment-grade issuers. The iTraxx Europe index is composed of
the most liquid 125 CDSs' referencing European investment grade and high yield corporate
credit instruments.
In addition, the study makes a second methodological contribution. Having established
a relationship between CDS indices and our measure of fragility for LCFIs we turn the
focus of our analysis to the problem of determining an institution's potential regulatory
capital requirement. To this end, we again use the VAR framework to perform a forward-
looking stress test exercise to estimate capital surcharges based on a variety of asset volatility
scenarios. Essentially, we impute the required capital injections per institution, based on
the distribution of the volatility of their own assets, given a-priori maximum probability of
default that is set at 1%. We believe that this setting constitutes a useful predictive tool
that nancial regulators may wish to employ to gauge the implications for the stability of
systemically important nancial institutions given developments in CDs markets.
The analytical foundations of our stress test scenario exercise draw from the stress test-
ing literature-thus allowing the model to focus on credit risk-and from the structured -
nance literature-thus enabling the model to consider the systemic eects of CDS shocks. By
adopting a clear and thorough methodology based on severe scenarios, providing detailed
bank-by-bank results and deploying, where necessary, remedial actions to strengthen the
capital position of individual banks, the stress test exercise is an important contribution to
strengthening the resilience and robustness of the global banking system.
In the past regulators have focused on traditional lending risks that form the basis of
bank capital requirements. The stress test provides a more rounded assessment of the
5amount of equity a bank needs in order to be considered well capitalised relative to the
risks it is running. Since the goal is to lessen the probability of tail-risk scenarios, following
this approach, the regulator would be able to identify the highest default risk probability
assigned to each institution over the cycle and base the capital surcharge on that asset
volatility scenario.
The third contribution is an empirical test of this framework for an important category
of nancial institutions, the Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), which can be
regarded as representative of the global banking system. The degree to which individual
banking groups are large in the sense that they could be a source of systemic risk depends
on the extent to which they can be a conduit for diusing idiosyncratic and systemic shocks
through a banking system. Broadly we can distinguish between two types of pure shocks
to a banking system systemic and idiosyn1cratic. The focus of attention of the authorities,
entrusted with the remit of nancial stability, is the monitoring of the impact of shocks
aecting simultaneously all the banks in the system.
A common nding in the empirical literature is that the level of banks' exposure to
systemic shocks tends to determine the extent and severity of a systemic crisis. However,
another source of systemic risk may originate from an individual bank through either its
bankruptcy or an inability to operate. The transmission channel of the idiosyncratic shock
can be direct, for example if the bank was to default on its interbank liabilities, or indirect,
whereby a bank's default leads to serious liquidity problems in one or more of the nancial
markets where it was involved.
As far we are able to determine, this is the rst investigation to establish a relationship
between the CDX and the iTraxx CDS indices and the banking sector which supports the
consideration of a transmission mechanism in order to account for the potential of default
risk of several global LCFIs. We adopt a working denition of banking instability as an
episode in which there is a signicant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock occurs
in the CDS market.
In early 2009, the US Fed conducted stress tests on its banking industry and found
that 10 lenders needed nearly $75bn of additional capital between them. This managed to
6soothe the markets and helped US banking stocks rebound. The stress tests were designed
to ensure the 19 leading US banks have enough capital in general, and equity in particular,
comfortably to survive a deeper-than-expected recession. They were also intended to provide
more standardized information about bank asset portfolios. Recently, the European Union
has also conducted stress tests on banks accounting for about 65 per cent of the EU banking
sector.
This application can be useful for supervisory scenario stress testing when complemented
with models of the probability of default and loss given default. Scenarios stress tests
involving both US and European LCFIs could help establish the level of impairment to
assets and capital needs.
Our most important ndings are threefold. First, we nd that systemically important
nancial institutions are exposed simultaneously to systematic CDs shocks. In practice, we
nd that the sensitivity of default risk across the banking system is highly correlated with
both the CDX and the iTraxx indices markets and that this relationship is of positive sign.
Hence, direct links between nancial institutions and the CDS index market matter. This is
evidence of some spillover eects from the CDS market after the onset of the crisis. Second,
our model allows us to quantify the required capital needs for each LCFI via the overall
price-discovery process in the two CDS indices markets. The main insight from our estimates
is that the US government re-capitalization programmes considerably underestimated the
necessary capital injections for the US LCFIs. A plausible explanation for this result is
that the specication of our model does do not reect any explicit or implicit government
guarantees on the total debt liabilities of the institutions. Third, XXXXXXXX
All our results have several important implications both for the nancial stability lit-
erature and for global banking regulators. The study oers an insight on the intricate
interrelationships between CDS markets developments and the individual and the systemic
stability dimensions of the international banking system. It helps to quantify the trans-
mission of shocks and their volatility to a specic metric of nancial stability. Our model
specication can help policymakers monitor default-risk and the distance to specic capital
thresholds of individual nancial institutions at a daily frequency by testing the extent of
7co-movements between North American and European CDS market conditions in normal as
well as stressful periods.
This suggests that our approach can serve as an early warning system for supervisors
to pursue closer scrutiny of a bank's risk prole, thereby prompting additional regulatory
capital and enhanced supervision to discourage practices that increase systemic risk. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section x(2) briey reviews the related
literature. Section x(3) outlines the theoretical foundations of our approach. Section 4
introduces the D-to-D approach and sketches in some detail our stress testing framework.
Section x(4) describes the data. The results are presented in x(5) and Section x(6) concludes.
2. Related Literature
The recent and growing literature on nancial innovation and nancial stability is char-
acterized by a lack of consensus on the net eect of CRT on the nancial system. Due
(2008) discusses the costs and benets of CRT instruments for the eciency and the stability
of the nancial system. The argument is that if CRT leads to a more ecient use of lender
capital, then the cost of credit is lowered, presumably leading to general macroeconomic
benets such as greater long-run economic growth. CRT could also raise the total amount
of credit risk in the nancial system to inecient levels, and this could lead to inecient
economic activities by borrowers. Allen and Gale (2006) develop a model of banking and
insurance and show that, with complete markets and contracts, inter-sectoral transfers are
desirable. However, with incomplete markets and contracts, CRT can occur as the result of
regulatory arbitrage and this can increase systemic risk.
Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, Allen and Carletti (2006) document
that the transfer between the banking sector and the insurance sector can lead to damaging
contagion of systemic risk from the insurance to the banking sector as the CRT induces
insurance companies to hold the same assets as banks. If there is a crisis in the insurance
sector, insurance companies will have to sell these assets, forcing down the price, which
implies the possibility of contagion of systemic risk to the banking sector since banks use
these assets to hedge their idiosyncratic liquidity risk.
8Morrison (2005) shows that a market for CDs can destroy the signalling role of bank
debt and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result. He suggests that disclosure
requirements for CDs can help oset this eect. Bystrom (2005) investigates the relationship
between the European iTraxx index market and the stock market. CDS spreads have a strong
tendency to widen when stock prices fall and vice versa. Stock price volatility is also found to
be signicantly correlated with CDS spreads and the spreads are found to increase (decrease)
with increasing (decreasing) stock price volatilities. The other interesting nding in this
paper is the signicant positive autocorrelation present in all the studied iTraxx indices.
Building upon a structural credit risk model (CreditGrades), Bystrom (2006) reinforces
this argument through a comparative evaluation of the theoretical and the observed market
prices of eight iTraxx sub-indices. The paper's main insight is the signicant autocorrelation
between theoretical and empirical CDS spreads changes. Hence, this nding proves to
be consistent with the hypothesis that the CDS market and the stock market are closely
interrelated.
Baur and Joossens (2006) demonstrate under which conditions loan securitization can
increase the systemic risks in the banking sector. They use a simple model to show how
securitization can reduce the individual banks' economic capital requirements by transferring
risk to other market participants and demonstrate that stability risks do not decrease due
to asset securitization. As a result, systemic risk can increase and impact on the nancial
system in two ways. First, if the risks are transferred to unregulated market participants
where there is less capital in the economy to cover these risks and second if the risks are
transferred to other banks, interbank linkages increase and therefore augment systemic risk.
A recent study by Hu and Black (2008) concludes that, thanks to the explosive growth in
CDs, debt-holders such as banks and hedge funds have often more to gain if companies
fail than if they survive. The study warns that the breakdown in the relationship between
creditors and debtors, which traditionally worked together to keep solvent companies out
of bankruptcy, lowers the system's ability to deal with a signicant downwar shift in the
availability of credit.
There is also little consensus on the relative importance of CDS and bond markets, and
9even less consensus on the CDS-equity markets relation. At least part of the diculty has
to do with measurement.
Zhu (2003) discusses the role of the CDS market in price discovery. Using a vector
autoregression (VAR) framework, he nds that in the short run the results are slightly
in favour of the hypothesis that the CDS market moves ahead of the bond market, thus
contributing more to price discovery. Similar to Zhu approach, Longsta, Mithal and Neis
(2005) use a VAR model to examine the lead-lag relationship between CDS, equity and
bond markets. They nd that both changes in CDS premiums and stock returns often lead
changes in corporate bond yields. In Jorion and Zhang (2006) investigation of the intra-
industry credit contagion eect in the CDS market and the stock market, the CDS market
is found to lead the stock market in capturing the contagion eect.
The traditional literature on the empirical applications of the Merton Model has long
recognized that the D-to-D measure can be an ecient analytical predictor of individual rm
fragility. A vast number of contributions have been developed, particularly in the banking
literature. Chan-Lau et al (2004) measure bank vulnerability in emerging markets using the
D-to-D. The indicator is estimated using equity prices and balance-sheet data for 38 banks
in 14 emerging market countries. They nd that the D-to-D can predict a bank's credit
deterioration up to nine months in advance and it may prove useful for supervisory core
purposes.
Berndt, Douglas, Due, Ferguson and Schronz (2004) examine the relationship between
CDS premiums and EDFs. Moodys KMV EDFs are conditional probabilities of default,
which are tted non-parametrically from the historical default frequencies of other rms
that had the same estimated D-to-D as the targeted rm. The D-to-D is the number of
standard deviations of annual asset growth by which its current assets exceed a measure of
book liabilities. They found that there is a positive link between 5-year EDFs and 5-year
CDS premiums. However, the sample only includes North American companies from three
industries. The result therefore might not be representative of the whole market.
Gropp et al (2006) show that the D-to-D may be a particularly suitable way to measure
bank risk, avoiding problems of other measures, such as subordinated debt spreads. The au-
10thors employ the Merton's model of credit risk to derive equity-based indicators for banking
soundness for a sample of European banks. They nd that the Merton style equity-based
indicator is ecient and unbiased as monitoring device. Furthermore, the equity-based in-
dicator is forward looking and can pre-warn of a crisis 12 to 18 months ahead of time. The
D-to-D is able to predict banks' downgrades in developed and emerging market countries.
Lehar (2005) proposes a new method to measure and monitor banking systemic risk.
This author proposes an index, based on the Merton model, which tracks the probability
of observing a systemic crisis - dened as a given number of simultaneous bank defaults -
in the banking sector at a given point in time. The method proposed allows regulators to
keep track of the systemic risk within their banking sector on an ongoing basis. It allows
comparing the risk over time as well as between countries. For a sample of North American
and Japanese banks (at the time of the Asian crisis in 1997/98) the author nds evidence
of a dramatic increase in the probability of a simultaneous default of the Japanese banks
whilst this decreases over time for the North American banks.
3. Methodology
We divide our empirical analysis into three sections. In the rst section xx(3.1), we
develop a theoretical framework for objective levels of default risk. In the second section
of our investigation, xx(3.2), we outline a generalized stochastic volatility model of bank
assets with multiple volatility instruments. Finally in the third section xx(3.3), we dene
an econometric model using a vector autoregressive model with multivariate autoregressive
conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances (VAR-MV-GARCH) to determine the time evo-
lution of the joint volatilities of the equity and our benchamrk CDS indices. We also extend
this model to infer forward looking simulations of the joint evolution of the asset value pro-
cess and hence determine the additional contingent capital requirements for each individual
LCFI.
113.1. Objective Levels of Default Risk
Consider a policy objective setting the default risk probability, over some relative time
horizon T   t, dened as p, such that for any systemically important institution, pi;t > p,
imposed by a regulator. The probability of default at time t, for the ith institution, will
be conditioned on the imputed conditional annualized volatility, ^ A;t, and value of assets,
^ VA;t. For any given systemically important nancial institution suering from some form
of nancial distress, with probability of default, pi;t, the dierence in probability p   pi;t,
under the assumption of conditional normality, will correspond to the dierence between
the minimum D-to-D set by the regulators and the current imputed distance
i;t =  (p
)    (pi;t) (1)
If i;t < 0, then we dene i;t as the distance to distress, if i;t > 0, then we dene i;t as the
distance to capital adequacy. Given i;t > 0, the required capital injection to boost the value
of assets to a point whereby  (p) =  (pi;t), i.e. i;t = VA (p)   VA (pi;t), is dened as the
capital shortfall.
Assuming that VE is the observed value of equity and VL is the observed value of liabilities
at time t, we can treat the capital requirement problem as a typical option pricing problem.
We rst take the standard assumption that VE is equivalent to a European call option on
assets at time T, which we impose exogenously. Furthermore we treat the liabilities as being
xed. The value of this call option will be dependent on the properties of the underlying
stochastic process driving the value of assets, with structural parameters A and the current
value of these assets VA;t, with strike price VL;t.
VE;t = C (t;T;VA;t;VL;t;A) (2)
The value of the call option will be proportional to the probability of default
p / C (t;T;VA;t;VL;tA) (3)
12furthermore assuming that for a given stochastic process the terminal distribution of asset
values at T is given by,
P (VA;T) =  (VA;T;t;T;VA;t;A) (4)
for a regulator the objective is to assess whether the probability that the value of assets at





this terminal distribution will depend on the choice of stochastic process driving VA;t.
3.2. A Stochastic Volatility Model of Bank Assets
We motivate our proposed relationship between the uctuations of the banks' assets and
developments in the market for CDS by considering the development of the value of the
assets VA of a typical bank with assets and liabilities VL.
Liabilities are xed and are of known value and liquidity. Assets are chosen from a
portfolio VA of risky underlying assets and hedging instruments such that VA(t) = 0S(t) +
0H(t), where S(t) and H(t) are vectors of risky and hedging instruments, respectively. The
appropriate length vectors of dynamically re-balanced weights that ensure the hedging ratio
maintains a target level of volatility are denoted by  and  . We dene two risk vectors.
The rst vector is the chosen level of risk VA to which a bank exposes itself in order to
generate potential excess return. The second risk vector is the level of completeness of the
hedging instruments. We consider this risk vector to be driven by k   1 risk instruments
xi 2 fx1;:::;xk 1g which can be regarded as representing counterparty risk embedded into
the hedging contracts used to control the banks exposure to risky assets and may or may
not be observed. Combining the assets and the instruments in the second risk vector, we
dene the k length vector y (t) =

VA (t);x1 (t);:::;xk (t)
0 and the multivariate stochastic
dierential equation that denotes its time evolution as follows
dy (t) = (y (t)j)dt +  (y (t)j)dW (t) (6)
13where  is a vector/matrix function of drifts,  is a vector/matrix function driving volatility
and W (t) is a k dimensional Weiner process, i.e. W i (t + h) W i (t)  N (0;h). Regarding
the the nature of () and (_ ), we proceed following the approach suggested by Williams
and Ioannidis (2010) and adopt a stochastic covariance model of the form
dy (t) = r(y (t))dt + 
1
2 (t)(idiag (y (t))dW (t)) (7)
A (t) = A(t)A
0 (t) (8)
A(t) = ivech(loga(t)) (9)
da(t) = (a(t))dt +  (a(t))dW(t)
 (10)
where r(y (t)) =

rVA (t);1x1 (t);:::;k 1xk 1 (t)
0 The rst term indicates that the evo-
lution asset growth is based on the instantaneous risk free rate r and f1;:::;k 1g are
the independent drifts of the instruments. The stochastic covariance matrix A (t) consists
of a 1
2k (k + 1) vector stochastic process a(t). For simplicity, we set , for the covariance
process to zero and the volatility of volatility function,  (); is considered time invariant
ai(t) 2 R. Williams and Ioannidis (2010) derive the optimal number of hedging instruments
for a simple stochastic covariance model to be 1
2k (k + 1)+1, given k diagonal and 1
2k (k   1)
o-diagonal processes driving the volatility component. The attractive feature of this model
is that it enables to derive an analytic specication of a single quantity that combines all
the relevant variance and covariance terms as A (t) is guaranteed to be PSD. The evolution
of y(t) from time t to t + h can be represented by an instantaneous multivariate Brownian
motion with covariance matrix





where f is a function that aggregates the steps in the volatility equation in 7. The use
of the ivech transformation ensures positive semi-deniteness (PSD) on any instantaneous
realization of t that allows for its factorization. Now, we denote 
1
2 (t) as the matrix
14square-root of the instantaneous covariance matrix (t). Depending upon the complexity
of the assumed processes driving a we can nd either an analytic solution to the variance
of volatility density or use Monte Carlo simulations. Here, we implement a Monte Carlo
estimation procedure. A European call option on the bank's assets would therefore be priced
over the integral of the possible volatilities
C (t;T;VS;K j) =
1 Z
0
(s) ~ C (t;T;Vs;K;s)ds (12)
where K is the strike price, T is the maturity of the call, under the assumption of an
equivalent time horizon T   t = h. Next we assign the ~ C to denote the individual Black
and Scholes price of a call option with volatility s, over an experiment space with respect
to s. Note that we are unable to observe the continuous time asset process. However, the
specication of our model can predict values of the call option, i.e. the value of equity,
that exhibit some form of stochastic covariation with the evolution of the chosen volatility
instruments. Therefore, we incorporate this property into an econometric specication of
equity. Consequently, the actual realisation of the volatility of equity results from the matrix
squareroot of the instantaneous covariance between equity and CDS indices and not merely
from the squareroot of the realisation of its variance. In practice this means simulating
across the parameter space of (t), to generate draws of the volatility process.
3.3. Econometric Specication
Under the framework illustrated above, we use a vector autoregression (VAR) model,
yt = Zyt 1++ut, with BEKK type multivariate autoregressive conditionally heteroskedas-
tic disturbances to dene the discrete time dynamics of the mean and variance systems.
Z is the 3  3 matrix of lagged coecients,  is a vector of intercepts and ut is a dis-
turbance process with conditional covariance matrix Etutu0
t = t. The vector of interest
is the VAR of the equity returns and log dierences of the CDX and iTraxx CDS indices,
yt = [log(VE;t);log(CDXt);log(iTraxxt)]
0. The VAR model disturbances are driven





We impose a lag order of one on both the mean and variance covariance equations. KK0
is the intercept in the variance equation and A and B are the 3  3 ARCH and GARCH
autoregression coecients, respectively. The long run covariance matrix of the VAR system
disturbances takes the following form
vec = (I   A 




The structural disturbances "t are computed from 
1
2
t ut = "t, where 
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2
t is the matrix square
root of t. Note that the mean and variance models are jointly estimated with maximum like-
lihood estimation (MLE). Setting the parameter vector  as  = [vecZ0;0;vechK0;vecA0;vecB0]
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where the recursion of the likelihood function is
`t j = detlogKK
0 + A
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(yt   Zyt 1   ) (16)
Using the estimated VAR and MV-GARCH parameters, we generate a set of Monte Carlo
pathways to simulate a set of possible future asset volatilities and then stratify these into a
set of future volatility scenarios.
163.4. Forward Looking Simulations
Specically, we draw N one year (252 days) pathways of the 3  1 column vector "t, i.e.
for the s

~ yt+s; ~ t+s
 ~ "t+(s 1);:::; ~ "t; ^  (17)
For each pathway, we compute the annualized average volatility2. We use to represent
the draw and evolution from one sample path. Following Hwertz (2005) who demonstrated
that BEKK type processes exhibit time varying multivariate fourth moments, we conduct
our simulation study across these time paths to capture this eect. We then sum over one




~ "t+(s 1);:::; ~ "t; ^ . Using the methodology of Merton,
we then compute for each pathway the value of assets, the volatility of assets, the distance
to default and the average probability of default.

~ VA; ~ A; ~ ; ~ p

, ?? outlines our approach
to computing the Merton model for a deterministic volatility. We then weight each of these
pathways by 1
N and sort them via the pathway average asset volatility. We exclude the top
and bottom 2.5% of the simulated asset volatilities and stratify the rest into ten quantiles,
ordered from low to high volatility levels. For each of these volatility quantiles, 
i21;:::;10
A , we
then derive the asset volatilities and compute the D-to-D for a variety of asset levels starting
with the current implied asset value ^ VA;t. To obtain the current asset value we take a mean
of the asset values computed over the three trading months (66 days) prior to April 29, 2009.
To further implement our test, we then construct an upward sloping curve relating the extra
required assets VA against the D-to-D, for the ith volatility quantile, 
  ^ VA + VA;i
A.
For a particular objective D-to-D we can then compute the increase in assets required to
reestablish adequate capital buers for each bank.
4. Data Sample
The group of LCFIs consist of eight US based institutions, three UK banks, two French
banks, two Swiss and one German banks. The Bank of England Financial Stability Review
2The variance-covariance matrices over all the paths will be centred around ^ 
17(2001) [? ] sets out classication criteria for LCFIs. Marsh, Stevens and Hawkesby (2003) [?
] provide substantial empirical evidence for this classication. To join the group of LCFIs
studied, a nancial institution must feature in at least two of six global rankings on a variety
of operational activities (these are set out in table 1). We base our classication on the
2003 rankings so that all the systemically important nancial institutions prior to the recent
nancial crisis are included. These institutions are systemically important as the fallout from
a bank failure can cause destabilizing eects for the world nancial system. It is not only an
institution's size that matters for its systemic importance - its interconnectedness and the
vulnerability of its business models to excess leverage or a risky funding structure matter as
well. These nancial institutions are ABN Amro/Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank of America,
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC
Holdings, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Soci et e G en erale
and UBS. In addition, we consider Bear Stearns, given its crucial role as market-maker in
the global CDs market.
The CDX and iTraxx CDS indices are broad investment-grade barometers of investment
grade risk and preliminary studies suggest that these oer a reasonable benchmark of the
corporate credit environment. The data used in this paper is presented in Table ??. The
sample period extends from October 20, 2003 to April 29, 2009 for a total of 1462 trading
days. All data is obtained from Thomson Reuters, Datastream. Liabilities are reported on
a quarterly basis and are interpolated to daily frequency using piecewise cubic splines. The
equity value of the LCFIs utilized in the VAR-MV-GARCH model are dividend adjusted.
The market capitalization values are computed from the product of the number of shares
(NOSH), the closing equity price (PC) and the index adjustment factor (AF), (Datastream
series types in parentheses).
Appendix ?? presents our methods of analysis of the indices available to measure credit
risk. Figures ?? to ?? illustrate the evolution of the variables used in the econometric model
over the sample period, in addition to several other CDS benchmarks that we have examined
in the data analysis stage of this research.
18Table 1: LCFI Inclusion Criteria, Source: Marsh, Stephens and Hawkesby (2003), page 94
1. Ten largest equity bookrunners world-wide
2. Ten largest bond bookrunners world-wide
3. Ten largest syndicated loans bookrunners world-wide
4. Ten largest interest rate derivatives outstanding world-wide
5. Ten highest FX revenues world-wide
6. Ten largest holders of custody assets world-wide.
Table 2: Data Information
Short Name Full Name DataStream Mnemonic Thomson-Reuters Code
BOA Bank of America U:BAC 923937
BS Bear Stearns U:BSC 936911
CITI Citigroup U: C 741344
GS Goldman Sachs U: GS 696738
JPM JP Morgan U: JPM 902242
LB Lehman Brothers U: LEH 131508
ML Merrill Lynch U: MER 922060
MS Morgan Stanley U: MWD 327998
SG Societe Generale F: SGE 755457
BNP BNP Paripas F: BNP 309449
DB Deutsche Bank D: DBK 905076
CS Credit Suisse S: CSGN 950701
UBS UBS S: UBSN 936458
BARC Barclays BARC 901443
HSBC HSBC HSBA 507534
RBS Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 901450
194.1. Causation in Mean and Variance
We set up two restriction tests for our econometric methodology. The rst is a con-
ventional directional block exogeneity test to test for directional eects on bank equity
returns. We dene Z = [zi] where zi is the ith row of the mean equation coecients,
zi = [zi;1;zi;2;zi;3]. The system consistent restriction allows for correlation in the structural
disturbances ut, but not in the autoregressive terms, Therefore, the restricted regression is of
the form yt = (I  Z)yt 1++ut, where I is a 33 identity matrix and  is the Hadamard









, the standard likelihood ratio test










, where 1  2(6), for each of the
block restrictions.
The variance test is slightly more complex, since the restrictions are block cross products.
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. In total 12 parameters are restricted.
Therefore, 2  2(12), under the assumption of asymptotic normality3.









204.2. Parameter Stability Tests
Out data sample covers the period October 20, 2003 to April 29, 2009 and hence fully
covers the nancial crisis that began in August 2007. An important consideration in the
parameter estimation and inference testing for this type of model is the issue of structural
breaks and substantial time variation in the underlying true parameters. To account for
this, we utilize a rolling versus static parameter estimation, which is an adaptation of the
modied KLIC forecast breakdown approach suggested in Giacomini and Rossi (2010). We
specify a minimum rolling window size of 20% of the complete sample, which is l = 292 days.
We estimate the model using a rolling window starting at t   l;t, i.e. taking t = 292 as
the starting date (November 30, 2004). We now consider two models: the model estimated
ex-post over the whole sample, denoted with superscript W and the rolling model denoted














































. Setting ~ & to
be the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimate of the standard deviation
of ~ t, we construct the rolling sum ~ t =
Pt
t=1 ~ & 1~ t, for t 2 f1;:::;Tg. Diebold and Mariano
(1996) derive the limit theorem for this type of comparative forecast statistic under relatively
mild distributional assumptions, suggesting that ~ t  N (0;1), as T ! 1. As a robustness
check, we construct a Monte Carlo simulation with random and persistent jumps. These
jumps are both positive and negative in magnitude. From the simulation we generate draws
of ~ t. The Kolomogorov-Smirno test failed to reject the null of equality for 10,000 draws
versus 10,000 draws from a N (0;1) distribution.
214.3. Estimating The Forward Looking Recapitalization Requirements
We establish a policy forecast period of one year, beginning on April 29, 2009. To
compute the simulations suggested in xx(3.4), we need to discriminate between the parameter
vectors   2 f^ R
T; ^ Wg, i.e. the whole period vector and the last 292 day estimated rolling
window parameter vector. We use the whole sample model parameters ^ W as the benchmark
and only choose ^ R
T if the rolling window coecients pertain to a better t over the majority
of the preceding 292 days. For instance, under the normality assumption this means that
~ t < 1:96 for more than 147 days out of 292, from t = T  292 to t = T, where T is April 29,
2009. We repeat this exercise for each bank. We report the optimal forward looking model
in Tables .4 and .5. In practice, the rolling window is preferred in the case of all 16 banks
in the sample4.
For each set of optimal forward looking parameters, we compute the restriction tests,
described in xx(4.1). The results are presented in Table 3. Again, we can observe that for
every bank in the analysis we reject the inclusion of the block exogeniety restrictions in
mean and variance.
4.4. Understanding the Results: A Comparative Example of RBS and Bear Stearns
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of our methodology, we now present an
illustrative example from our sample of 16 banks. Specically, here we focus on two insti-
tutions adversely aected by the subprime mortgage crisi, namely RBS and Bear Stearns.
Table ?? outlines the performance of these institutions after the onset of the crisis. We can
see that both RBS and Bear Stearns suered severe losses, which resulted in changes in the
ownership structure from the pre to post crisis periods. RBS was partly nationalized by
the UK government and Bear Stearns was rescued by the Federal Reserve and then sold
to J. P. Morgan. The subplots in Figures 1 and 2 outline, respectively for RBS and Bear
Stearns, the market capitalization (top left), total liabilities (top right), historical volatility
from the rolling VAR-MV-GARCH models (bottom left) and the historical D-to-Ds (bottom
right). Bear Stearns was rescued by the Federal Reserve on March 14, 2008. As such, the
4The full set of recursive coecients is available on the authors website.
22Table 3: The block exogeniety/causation tests in mean, 1, and variance 2 for each bank in the sample.
1 p   value 2 p   value
BOA 186.3036 0.0000 4,210.4354 0.0000
BS 5,000.4120 0.0000 12,936.3721 0.0000
CITI 173.4772 0.0000 4,078.8147 0.0000
GS 131.8649 0.0000 2,299.6358 0.0000
JPM 216.0993 0.0000 3,110.2434 0.0000
LB 133.2388 0.0000 5,205.7893 0.0000
ML 1,410.7806 0.0000 4,754.0902 0.0000
MS 213.7156 0.0000 3,130.9067 0.0000
SG 156.1321 0.0000 2,328.5144 0.0000
BNP 188.3487 0.0000 2,362.9616 0.0000
DB 200.1796 0.0000 2,524.7460 0.0000
CS 206.2118 0.0000 2,354.1980 0.0000
UBS 190.0040 0.0000 2,567.1817 0.0000
BARC 129.5412 0.0000 3,069.9669 0.0000
HSBC 171.0778 0.0000 2,892.7295 0.0000
RBS 121.8059 0.0000 3,794.0576 0.0000
we truncate the rolling analysis at this point. Consequently, we run the forward looking
recapitalization requirement from this date. Note that RBS stock was still traded until the
end of the sample window. Therefore, we carry the analysis forward to the truncation date,
that is April 29, 2009. Note also that, in addition to Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch (acquired
by Bank of America) and Lehman Brothers (led for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008)
are no longer traded as a separate entity within the sample.
We next compute the rolling parameter estimates for each model versus the whole sample
parameter estimates. We present four examples for each bank over the sample period. These
are plotted in Figures 3 and 4. We can observe the rst order vector autoregressive coecient,
z1;1 on equity (top left), the variance equation intercept coecient on the equity, k1;1, (top
right), the lagged coecient transmitting the lag of the CDX to equity, z1;2, (bottom left),
and nally the variance equation intercept cross product k1;2 for the variance of equity from
the lagged squared disturbance in the CDS index (top right).
Using the time varying parameters, we can compute the rolling comparative test statistic
and infer the correct forward looking model specication. Figures 5 and 6 present the rolling
23Figure 1: RBS Data
Figure 2: Bear Stearns Data
comparative loss statistics and their respective Monte Carlo signicant bounds. For both
banks the test estimates are below the lower signicance threshold (indicating the rolling
window is the optimal model) for the nal part of the sample. As a result, we choose the
model estimated over the 20% of the sample preceding April 29, 2009 for RBS and March
14, 2008 for Bear Stearns.
For each bank we then run the simulation outlined in xx(3.4). We report the results
in the following format. Rows represent dierent tolerated risk stratications, from one
standard deviation to default,  = 1, to four standard deviations from default,  = 4. In the
second column we also report the conditional log-normal probability of default. The columns
represent the 90% mass of expected (unhedged, see x(3)) asset volatilities partitioned by 15-
percentiles, ranging from the lowest (5%) to the highest (95%) expected asset volatility.
The second row reports the asset volatility associated with the relative 15-percentiles. The
interior of the grid reports the extra required assets for each risk tolerance - asset volatility
15-percentiles, in billions of US Dollars. For instance, in the event that Bear Stearns was
subjected to an unhedged asset and volatility of 1%, which is in the rst 15-percentiles
below the median expected volatility, the bank would require US$ 8.0377 billion to contain
the one-year insolvency risk at below 0.5%.
By contrast, RBS for the same level of unhedged asset volatility and risk tolerance would
incur in an asset shortfall of US$81.1805 billion. For comparison, we also report in Table ??
the raised private and public support received by each troubled LCFI.
Figure 3: RBS Parameters
24Figure 4: Bear Stearns Parameters
Figure 5: RBS Comparative Loss Statistic
5. Results and Analysis
5.1. Analysis of Dynamic Correlations
The objective of our analysis is to forecast the volatility of assets and its conditional
quadratic covariation with the benchmark CDS indices. The VAR-MV-GARCH model cap-
tures time varying dependency in both direction and variation of the dynamic equations of
interest (in our case equity, CDX and iTraxx). The employment of the VAR-MV-GARCH
model allows for the estimation and testing of volatility transmission between the elements
entering the VAR. The results from VAR-MV-GARCH models are presented in Appendix
B. The vast majority of the estimated coecients are statistically signicant and there is
no evidence of statistical misspecication. The results indicate a strong negative correlation
between both indices and institutional equity and more importantly when the correlation of
returns between the indices increases there is a marked rise in the negative correlation be-
tween equity returns of banks and the indices. Exclusion restrictions to establish the linear
independence of equity returns and the evolution of the indices were decisively rejected in
all cases establishing thus the empirical validity of the estimated model.
From the estimated coecients we calculate the time evolution of the conditional volatil-
ities and associated correlation coecients. On the basis of these estimates, we also compute
the value of the assets (Figure E.13), the imputed volatility (Figure E.17), the D-to-D (gure
E.15) and the subsequent probability of default (gure E.16) for the sixteen LCFIs. For ease
of presentation, the results are disaggregated based primarily on geography. As such, we
follow a nationality grouping classication criteria as indicated by obvious divisions between
US, UK, Swiss/German and French LCFIs. It can be seen that the time evolution of equity
volatility exhibits common characteristics across LCFI's and, as expected, the conditional
Figure 6: Bear Stearns Comparative Loss Statistic
25correlation with equity is consistently negative with both indices. However, there are subtle
dierences in these patterns both in terms of magnitude and more importantly in terms of
the timing that changes in direction and intensity occur.
Beginning the discussion of the results with the group of US-based LCFIs, the path of
the conditional equity volatility displays a modest upward movement since August 2007,
following a very at trajectory in the sub-period sample preceding the crisis. We can also
see that asset volatility peaks up very rapidly by the last quarter of 2008. For pure invest-
ment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, the peaked values
range between .1 and .2 and they subsequently decline to lower levels, albeit still-elevated
compared to their pre-crisis peak values. Unsurprisingly, for Lehman Brothers the increase
is of exceptional magnitude as it is equal to 1.1, a ve-fold increase compared to its peers.
At the same time the conditional correlations of the equity value for the three survived
investment banks with both the CDX and the iTraxx are negative throughout the entire
sample period and show an accelerating negative trend in early 2008. Such trend does not
dissipate even in early 2009 and demonstrates that there is a very clear pattern of feedback
eects between the CDS index market and the equity market value of these institutions. In
particular, such relationship becomes more pronounced over the nancial crisis period with
an average correlation value rising almost continuously from the beginning of 2005 through
the rst quarter of 2009, by which time correlation levels have increased from -.25 to -.6.
The estimated conditional correlation from the model also shows that for Lehman Brothers
correlations are relatively steady over the period starting from a substantially higher value
of approximately -.4. The Lehman collapse causes the largest increase of co-movements
between these variables.
It is important to note that at the beginning of the sample the correlation between the
equity and the CDX index tends to exceed that with the iTraxx but then this relationship
encounters a potential break during the onset of the subprime crisis, then the relative dom-
inance of the CDX almost disappears and the relative weight of the two indices becomes
virtually indistinguishable. Citigroup follows approximately the same pattern but with a
higher intensity as the maximum equity volatility reaches .35 and the correlation with both
26indices reaches -.8. The ndings also suggest that Bear Stearns equity volatility sharply
explodes in the rst quarter of 2008 picking up to around 0.6, with negative conditional
correlations sharply reversing their downward trend during 2007.
Within the group of UK LCFIs, noticeably RBS exhibits the highest equity volatility,
with a value of .35, compared to relatively contained levels for HSBC (.1) and for Barclays
(.2). Thus, the equity volatility of RBS spikes dramatically during 2008, but then essen-
tially, following the UK Government's nancial support for RBS, returns to its pre-crisis
pattern. Note also that there are no major changes in the conditional correlations although
quite remarkably the average correlation of equity for the UK banks with the iTraxx index
precipitously jumps at an elevated level.
Our estimates of the conditional equity volatility of continental European banks are
substantially lower with the maximum values not exceeding .1. The volatility paths followed
by BNP Paribas, Societe Generale and UBS display a very modest upward trend and do show
abrupt upwards movements, whilst the volatility patterns observed for Deutsche Bank and
Credit Suisse track closely the levels experienced by the US and the UK institutions. With
the exception of UBS, the average correlation across the indices is of the same magnitude
and is in line with the evolution of the other two banks. Remarkably, in the case of UBS
the conditional correlation remains negative throughout the whole period and starting from
a relatively important level (-.4) declines steadily after August 2007 end ends the sample
period at just above zero.
Overall, the average correlation between the indices increases from approximately .4 (its
average pre-crisis value) to a value in excess of .6, whilst the correlation between the indices
and equity returns becomes more pronounced with an average value of -.6 compared to -.25.
Such patterns are observed uniformly across all the banks and constitute strong evidence of
detrimental volatility transmission between the evolution of the indices and the equity of all
the banks included in this study. It is the uniformity of reaction, both in terms of size and
direction to the same shock that constitutes a severe threat to the stability of the banking
system.
For all sixteen LCFIs the resulting CDPs increase very sharply during 2008. These indi-
27cators therefore show that when the subprime crisis begins to evolve into a global nancial
crisis the average dependence among the global sample of banks equity and CDS indices
enters an accelerating phase that reaches a peak towards the end of 2008. This nding is
consistent with the evidence presented in a recent study by Longsta (2010) who nds a
rapid increase in cross-nancial markets linkages as the subprime crisis developed.
From a visual inspection, the banks included in this study, in principle, clearly divide
into two groups: the US and UK LCFIs AND the continental European LCFIs, the dif-
ference being the height of the jump of the default probability at the peak of the crisis in
the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. For several US banks the CDP rises to 35%
whilst for the European block the CDP are generally not greater than 25%. In the UK for
HSBC the relevant probability is just above 5% (on an annual basis) whilst, not surprisingly,
whilst Barclays and RBS are subject to substantial increases to default probability. More
specically, this value for RBS far exceeds 35%, rendering the bank totally dependent on
government support to ensure its survival. After the announcement of in-all-but-name na-
tionalization of the bank, the associated probability of default reverts sharply to safe levels.
The results also show signicant dissimilarities in the probability of default between the US
institutions as some of them show distinct reductions, whilst for others the probability of
default increases over the latest part of the period under consideration. More specically,
the distress indicators clearly shows that for Citigroup, Bank of America and Morgan Stan-
ley default risk continue to increase much above the historical trend, in the aftermath of
Lehman Brothers' default. At the other hand of the spectrum, LCFIs, such as Goldman
Sachs and J. P. Morgan, are about equally less vulnerable to pullover eects from the CDS
market and hence more resilient to the liquidity crisis. Overall, the results indicate that
systemic bank risks and CD market shocks appear to be highly dependent. These results
are also consistent with those found in other studies (see, the IMF (2009, a, b)).
Stress testing involves hypothesizing changes in the aggregate volatility of the banks'
assets and gives a simple measure of potential risk vectors in their aggregate form. These
types of measures should prevent banks from leveraging themselves to a point whereby they
are extremely vulnerable to changes in asset volatility, which would then require costly
28readjustments, possibly forcing a bank below some critical solvency thresholds
5.2. Analysis of D-2-D Injections (Stress Testing)
In view of the econometric evidence, we proceed by conducting a bank stress-testing
exercise for a given value of the liabilities to evaluate the imputed adequate bank capital
requirements to ensure the soundness of each institution. Such a strong assumption is jus-
tied in the current circumstances because their valuation is more accurate when compared
to the valuation of assets. A stress test exercise involves hypothesizing changes in the ag-
gregate volatility of the banks' assets and gives a simple measure of potential risk vectors
in their aggregate form. These types of measures should prevent banks from leveraging
themselves to a point whereby they are extremely vulnerable to changes in asset volatility,
which would then require costly readjustments, possibly forcing a bank below some critical
solvency thresholds.
5.3. Asset Volatility and Required Capital Injections
The results are presented in gures D.8-D.10. The limiting D-to-D is denoted by the
horizontal line that marks the associated D-to-D for each bank given the imposed 1% proba-
bility to default as the maximum tolerated stay requirement before a regulator could decide
to impose a contingent capital surcharge following a distress event. These gures associate
the required increase in the value of equity for any realised value of asset volatility condi-
tional on a xed value of liabilities. The analysis is necessarily aggregate and stylized, and is
not intended to substitute for detailed analysis of the needs of specic institutions' business
activities or portfolios.
The required capital injections estimates, computed using the D-to-D methodology, need
the following qualication. The assets are assumed to be drawn from a pool that preserves
the overall level of volatility and capital injections by governments are considered almost
risk-less and therefore will reduce the accumulation of balance sheet risks. Whether the
re-payment level on these assets is recognized as a liability is a current point of debate in
policy circles, particularly in the US and the UK.
29A key aspect of the study is that stress-test indicators can show moves to medium- and
high-volatility states and hence can be used to assess the degree of current banking fragility
and uncertainty. Such indicators may also be useful in establishing whether and when a
systemic crisis is subsiding, particularly if the low-volatility state persists, and thus when
the withdrawal supportive crisis measures can be safely considered.
The volatility estimates are obtained from Monte-Carlo simulations using the estimated
coecients from the multivariate GARCH model. They are sorted in deciles with the exclu-
sion of the tails immediately above the 2.5% cut-o. A close inspection of the range of the
projected asset volatility values reveals substantial dierences across nancial institutions.
Of those US LCFIs able to survive the crisis, Bank of America exhibits the largest degree of
variability of asset volatility, ranging from .019 to 0.15, whilst unsurprisingly the institution
with the narrowest dispersion is Goldman Sachs whose upper deciles remain below 0.079.
The estimated asset volatilities for Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley are shown
here to range between 0.018 and .11. By contrast, the asset volatility range for European
LCFIs is rather narrow, with the exception of RBS whose volatility range reaches 0.077
exceeding by far the upper limit of the other European institutions. Such wide variations
clearly underscore substantial dierences in the resilience of LCFI to withstand identical
adverse-case scenarios. A slight increase in volatility from a given overall safe level results
in diering additional capital requirements for the sixteen institutions included in our sam-
ple. Overall, the main takeaway from our simulations is that the 'average' asset volatility
of US-based LCFIs is substantially higher compared to non-US institutions. With such
system-wide heterogeneity across institutions the development of common prudential regu-
latory standards aimed at protecting banks solvency may prove somewhat problematic and
thus the implementation of reliable tools for this task should proceed expeditiously.
The magnitudes of the eects are nontrivial. Indeed, with respect to the US institutions,
we nd that for only a rather narrow range of asset volatilities they are able to comply with
the imposed safety requirement. Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Goldman
Sachs require no further capital injections provided that asset volatility does not exceed
0.002. This nding is noteworthy as this value represents the lowest of deciles in the empir-
30ical volatility distribution derived from our simulations. The results indicate that a severe
deterioration of market conditions resulting in higher asset volatility will augment aggre-
gate banking system capital needs. Assuming that all the US LCFIs were to experience
the same level of asset volatility of 0.04, a value consistent with the mid-decile of the em-
pirical distribution, the needed funds for a complete bank recapitalization will be roughly
$300bn. Interestingly, the most vulnerable institutions appear to be Bank of America and
J.P. Morgan requiring $150bn each whereas the individual capital injections for bank holding
companies such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley stand at $40bn and $50bn, respec-
tively. Furthermore, if each individual institution were subject to the 'mode' of the empirical
asset volatility distribution, which corresponds to the fourth decile, then the required capital
adequacy, surcharges are statistically and economically signicant. Specically, we project
such injections ranging from $250bn required for Bank of America to $40bn for Goldman
Sachs.
In striking contrast, BNP Paribas and Societe Generale, the two French LCFIs in the
sample, appear to be relatively safe within the limits of their volatility distributions as no
capital injections are required for asset volatility levels not exceeding the fourth decile. Even
in presence of rather adverse volatility regimes the size of capital cushions does not exceed
$200bn. The Swiss and German banks appear somewhat more vulnerable to realisations of
volatility in excess of the third decile, although conditions have to substantially deteriorate
to absorb extra capital in the case of Deutsche Bank. This nding indicates that for realised
asset volatility at the 'mode' these banking institutions will face a capital shortfall of $160bn.
As such, this should be viewed as indicative of the recapitalization needs by these banks to
stabilize this segment of the European banking system.
Focusing next on the UK based-LFCIs, the results show a mixed pattern. Interestingly,
HSBC appears to be the most resilient institution. For the rst two deciles of volatility
no further equity is needed to meet the policy objective, whilst at `mode' $100bn will be
required. In contrast, Royal Bank of Scotland seems to be one of the more vulnerable
LCFIs as reected in its higher capital requirements. Our calculations suggest that if asset
volatility reaches the specic threshold requirement, capital injections would need to be some
31$200bn whilst a more demanding level of volatility - standing at a 'mode' intensity -raises the
amount of capital to be injected to around $260bn. Barclays experiences a wide range within
its volatility distribution suggesting no call for extra capital. However, a higher volatility
scenario for the bank - asset volatility at mode value of 0.017- will push up considerably the
recapitalization needs, possibly totalling $100bn.
Overall, our stress-testing results clearly highlight the dangers of signicant losses, as a
relatively large number of LCFIs are not adequately capitalized and individually capable of
surviving reasonable stress events. The deterioration of the quality of assets signalled by
conditions in the CDS index market points to comparatively substantial capital injections
required to restore banks' balance sheets to health. Notably for most European banks there
is a reasonably wide range of asset volatilities for which additional equity is not needed to
cushion potential writedowns. In contrast, for the US banks the `safe range' of volatilities is
somewhat narrow. Not surprisingly, given the common heavy exposure of these institutions
to subprime-mortgage related securities, what emerges from this exercise is that in absence
of rigorous policy measures to address troubled assets, the banks included in this study
(with the notable exception of HSBC) enter the `insolvency state'. However, in some cases
this distress proves to be relatively short-lived. Thus, the empirical evidence underscore
that capital adequacy for systemically important nancial institutions remains fractured in
response to CDS index market shocks.
Remaining in a high-volatility regime for long could indicate a serious threat to the
stability of the banking system. Consequently, there is clear evidence that the resilience
of the banking sector is conditional upon a sustained improvement to the banks' balance
sheets. As a result, there remains considerable scope for further fresh capital infusions for
LCFIs.
Thus, these results are consistent with the emerging consensus that the long-term viabil-
ity of institutions needs to be revaluated to assess both prospects for further write downs and
potential capital needs. Without a thorough cleansing of banks' balance sheets of impaired
assets, accompanied by restructuring and, where needed, recapitalization, risks remain that
banks' problems will continue to exert upward pressure on systemic risk. Without making a
32judgment about the appropriateness of our asset volatility scenarios, it is important to note
that these amounts are 'inated' to the degree that governments have guaranteed banks
against further losses of some of the bad assets on their balance sheets.
Furthermore, if we consider a more conservative regulatory approach establishing the
maximum tolerated default probability below 1% almost all of the institutions included in
this study will be in need of substantial additional equity injections from governments. For
any given safety limit the key information provided by developments in the CRT market
provide a valuable signal to the authorities about the additional capital requirements for
each nancial institution and more importantly about the overall fragility of the banking
system.
In summary, these results do provide evidence that observing shifts in asset volatility
regimes using the CDX and iTraxx indices as aggregating measures of corporate default risk
can be helpful in detecting the degree to which the nancial system is suering a systemic
event.
6. Concluding Remarks
Bank default risk is currently the predominant issue of concern to academic, nancial
practitioners and policymakers across the world. The recent failure of several LCFIs illus-
trates that the too big to fail paradigm predominant in the analysis of nancial stability of
large mainstream commercial and investment banks is no longer valid. We approach the
issue of the stability of the banking sector by studying the potential eects of CDs on the
statistical moments of the equity of LFCIs.
This paper oers a concrete illustration of the direct links between the global banking
system and the CDs index market. We propose a set of models and empirical tests for
predicting the current and future linkages between various CD markets and nancial in-
stitutions. Specically, we jointly model the evolution of equity returns and asset return
volatility of 16 systemically important LCFIs, using a VAR-MV-GARCH model, with the
evolution of the two standardized CDS indices. The conditional equity volatilities are used
to impute the value and volatility of assets using a Merton type model.
33The impact of developments in the CD market on asset volatility is captured by the
evolution of the investment-grade CDX North-American and the iTraxx Europe indices. We
estimate a multivariate GARCH model to forecast the future volatility conditioned on the
co-evolution of the equity returns and the CDs market. The econometric framework allows
for testing of the predictive contribution of developments in the CD market on the stability
of the banking sector as depicted by the D-to-D of major nancial institutions.
The evidence in the paper suggests that the presence of a market for CDs would tend to
increase the propagation of shocks and not act as a dilution mechanism. We have produced
strong econometric evidence of a substantial detrimental volatility pullover from the CDs
market to bank equity, which aects negatively the stability of the banking system in both
the USA and Europe.
In view of this evidence, we conclude that banks' equity volatility associated with sig-
nicant stress in the CD market matters for systemic distress. In the presence of increasing
asset volatility, nancial institutions require fresh capital injections. Our calculations are
based on the assumption that the value of liabilities is know. Therefore, the safety and
soundness of each particular institution is a function of the market value of the assets. We
view these results as encouraging, and we hope that the approach we take will be useful in
future explorations.
Future research should relax this assumption and allow for the stochastic uctuation of
the value of the liabilities and its possible relationship with the value of assets. An addi-
tional innovation could be the adoption of pareto-stable distributions in place of the normal
distribution that is commonly believed to underestimate the true frequency of extreme ob-
servations. This study helps to shed more light on the CDS index market and its interaction
with other markets and inform on regulatory implications. Authorities are currently imple-
menting a diverse set of regulatory regimes to ensure an eective regulation of CD markets
through enhanced transparency and disclosure of the sector. The on-going debate on CD
markets regulation calls for further investigation - both theoretical and empirical - to assist
policymakers and regulators to identify the most eective regulatory response.
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=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0207 0.0222 0.0247 0.0280 0.0346 0.0454 0.0860
1 0.1586 32.7031 35.8843 41.1420 47.8915 61.9483 85.0088 176.8674
1.5 0.0668 53.7815 58.5676 66.5171 76.6619 97.8949 132.7219 272.1701
2 0.0227 75.0791 81.5019 92.2014 105.8278 134.4558 181.5152 371.6495
2.5 0.0062 96.5982 104.7021 118.1940 135.4323 171.6410 231.4129 475.5413
3 0.0013 118.3411 128.1710 144.4985 165.4201 209.4755 282.4841 583.9765
3.5 0.0002 140.3100 151.8998 171.1570 195.8639 248.0005 334.7287 697.1529
4 0.0000 162.5074 175.8915 198.1491 226.7212 287.1836 388.1560 815.3456
Table .7: BS
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0063 0.0084 0.0100 0.0118 0.0147 0.0183 0.0268
1 0.1586 0.5451 1.2165 1.7333 2.3088 3.2758 4.4347 7.2574
1.5 0.0668 1.5587 2.5634 3.3388 4.2075 5.6633 7.4031 11.6547
2 0.0227 2.5723 3.9186 4.9579 6.1140 8.0682 10.3985 16.1075
2.5 0.0062 3.5910 5.2790 6.5796 8.0377 10.4888 13.4213 20.6272
3 0.0013 4.6147 6.6428 8.2149 9.9673 12.9252 16.4716 25.2049
3.5 0.0002 5.6385 8.0168 9.8530 11.9123 15.3853 19.5498 29.8403
4 0.0000 6.6659 9.3909 11.5047 13.8673 17.8621 22.6588 34.5463
Table .8: CITI
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0210 0.0225 0.0237 0.0255 0.0287 0.0357 0.0498
1 0.1586 28.5317 31.1782 33.2771 36.4709 42.1788 54.9721 80.8747
1.5 0.0668 46.8404 50.8381 54.0027 58.8028 67.3807 86.6883 125.8568
2 0.0227 65.3423 70.7240 74.9698 81.4080 92.9847 118.9856 171.9671
2.5 0.0062 84.0396 90.8326 96.1809 104.3079 118.9247 151.8802 219.2463
3 0.0013 102.9386 111.1664 117.6389 127.5201 145.2678 185.3608 267.7146
3.5 0.0002 122.0423 131.7278 139.3508 151.0164 171.9740 219.4377 317.4082
4 0.0000 141.3477 152.5194 161.3459 174.8003 199.0710 254.1213 368.3549
Table .9: GS
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0181 0.0199 0.0220 0.0283 0.0341 0.0422 0.0571
1 0.1586 0.0000 11.9832 13.6585 18.7479 23.5148 30.1794 42.7638
1.5 0.0668 17.7163 19.8001 22.3209 29.9997 37.1748 47.2416 66.2968
2 0.0227 24.9007 27.6952 31.0783 41.4002 51.0639 64.6668 90.5099
2.5 0.0062 32.1501 35.6693 39.9318 52.9674 65.2087 82.4629 115.4228
3 0.0013 39.4650 43.7231 48.8824 64.7012 79.5902 100.6376 141.0556
3.5 0.0002 46.8459 51.8575 57.9312 76.5926 94.2122 119.1990 167.4291
4 0.0000 54.2936 60.0733 67.0792 88.6696 109.0939 138.1627 194.5646
42Table .10: JPM
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0183 0.0205 0.0238 0.0282 0.0348 0.0458 0.0762
1 0.1586 26.1236 30.3231 36.8266 45.4195 58.3192 80.6012 144.3920
1.5 0.0668 43.5918 49.9137 59.6957 72.6650 92.1297 125.8037 222.5284
2 0.0227 61.2198 69.7066 82.8598 100.2713 126.5207 172.0378 303.7204
2.5 0.0062 79.0199 89.7037 106.3054 128.3126 161.5018 219.3269 388.0738
3 0.0013 96.9883 109.9071 130.0253 156.7189 197.1164 267.7376 475.6975
3.5 0.0002 115.1212 130.3191 154.0228 185.5510 233.3628 317.2729 566.7180
4 0.0000 133.4204 150.9416 178.3009 214.7870 270.2313 367.9385 661.2665
Table .11: LB
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0153 0.0170 0.0200 0.0231 0.0303 0.0368 0.0553
1 0.1586 5.2570 6.0564 7.5798 9.1133 12.7370 16.0775 25.8031
1.5 0.0668 9.0150 10.2197 12.5136 14.8206 20.2872 25.3228 40.0313
2 0.0227 12.7993 14.4174 17.4972 20.5930 27.9442 34.7385 54.6557
2.5 0.0062 16.6179 18.6499 22.5310 26.4314 35.7260 44.3279 69.6887
3 0.0013 20.4671 22.9174 27.6157 32.3364 43.6193 54.0940 85.1518
3.5 0.0002 24.3435 27.2224 32.7516 38.3145 51.6397 64.0433 101.0455
4 0.0000 28.2470 31.5684 37.9393 44.3633 59.7768 74.1816 117.3818
Table .12: ML
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0144 0.0164 0.0190 0.0221 0.0268 0.0373 0.0750
1 0.1586 7.3927 8.9716 10.9363 13.3747 17.0634 25.3325 56.7147
1.5 0.0668 12.8496 15.2093 18.1686 21.8381 27.3993 39.8679 87.4239
2 0.0227 18.3400 21.5090 25.4698 30.3949 37.8659 54.6757 119.3178
2.5 0.0062 23.8641 27.8591 32.8405 39.0532 48.4871 69.7669 152.4325
3 0.0013 29.4331 34.2592 40.2815 47.8086 59.2476 85.1460 186.8083
3.5 0.0002 35.0470 40.7098 47.7933 56.6605 70.1441 100.8134 222.4931
4 0.0000 40.6953 47.2112 55.3767 65.6102 81.2044 116.7745 259.5530
Table .13: MS
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0163 0.0177 0.0198 0.0247 0.0318 0.0402 0.0540
1 0.1586 8.5237 9.6156 11.1593 14.8421 20.1939 26.6820 37.5091
1.5 0.0668 14.4819 16.1242 18.4424 23.9815 32.0469 41.8492 58.2318
2 0.0227 20.4865 22.6919 25.7982 33.2468 44.1041 57.3250 79.5154
2.5 0.0062 26.5377 29.3175 33.2273 42.6249 56.3466 73.1157 101.3837
3 0.0013 32.6358 36.0013 40.7306 52.1156 68.7854 89.2277 123.8596
3.5 0.0002 38.7849 42.7439 48.3088 61.7202 81.4300 105.6676 146.9439
4 0.0000 44.9922 49.5459 55.9626 71.4537 94.2642 122.4419 170.6528
43Table .14: SG
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0108 0.0119 0.0131 0.0145 0.0163 0.0189 0.0260
1 0.1586 8.6896 10.1533 11.9094 13.8448 16.3846 20.1114 30.2907
1.5 0.0668 16.2458 18.4330 21.0822 24.0012 27.8296 33.4280 48.7578
2 0.0227 23.8554 26.7955 30.3211 34.2211 39.3638 46.8709 67.4766
2.5 0.0062 31.4875 35.1850 39.6307 44.5266 50.9878 60.4473 86.4274
3 0.0013 39.1860 43.6320 48.9852 54.9138 62.7022 74.1543 105.6207
3.5 0.0002 46.8967 52.1330 58.4107 65.3660 74.5175 87.9914 125.0894
4 0.0000 54.6830 60.6649 67.9046 75.8836 86.4417 101.9600 144.7996
Table .15: BNP
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0099 0.0106 0.0112 0.0119 0.0130 0.0148 0.0187
1 0.1586 15.0177 17.0099 18.7971 20.5850 23.9050 28.9842 40.0749
1.5 0.0668 29.0291 32.0073 34.6783 37.3668 42.3761 50.0361 66.7070
2 0.0227 43.1146 47.1186 50.7093 54.3001 60.9655 71.2264 93.5886
2.5 0.0062 57.2668 62.2666 66.7770 71.3055 79.7105 92.5578 120.7319
3 0.0013 71.4929 77.5488 82.9791 88.4091 98.5443 114.1015 148.1380
3.5 0.0002 85.7873 92.8501 99.2457 105.6408 117.5091 135.7871 175.8009
4 0.0000 100.1554 108.3042 115.6106 122.9282 136.6222 157.6152 203.7230
Table .16: DB
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0070 0.0075 0.0082 0.0090 0.0098 0.0110 0.0134
1 0.1586 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 13.4019 18.5260
1.5 0.0668 12.2912 13.9666 16.0248 18.5710 21.1919 24.9386 32.6015
2 0.0227 19.6373 21.8685 24.6092 27.9993 31.4884 36.5221 46.8105
2.5 0.0062 26.9835 29.7704 33.2075 37.4840 41.8851 48.1747 61.1013
3 0.0013 34.3549 37.7312 41.8782 47.0070 52.2850 59.8972 75.4661
3.5 0.0002 41.7749 45.7125 50.5488 56.5667 62.7834 71.6669 89.9622
4 0.0000 49.1949 53.7020 59.2832 66.1854 73.2879 83.5298 104.5467
Table .17: CS
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0136 0.0150 0.0172 0.0195 0.0229 0.0269 0.0389
1 0.1586 8.2749 9.6197 11.6540 13.8389 17.0513 20.8538 32.4276
1.5 0.0668 14.5341 16.5615 19.6273 22.9176 27.7525 33.4689 50.9450
2 0.0227 20.8557 23.5532 27.6677 32.0855 38.5752 46.2745 69.8259
2.5 0.0062 27.2110 30.6119 35.7759 41.3435 49.5207 59.2422 89.0773
3 0.0013 33.6001 37.7182 43.9523 50.6924 60.5903 72.3801 108.7066
3.5 0.0002 40.0499 44.8723 52.1987 60.1330 71.7857 85.7124 128.7212
4 0.0000 46.5374 52.0769 60.5268 69.6664 83.1225 99.2134 149.1286
44Table .18: UBS
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0124 0.0134 0.0149 0.0163 0.0192 0.0230 0.0294
1 0.1586 9.5325 10.6766 12.5763 14.3341 17.8662 22.5342 30.5955
1.5 0.0668 17.0898 18.8120 21.6768 24.3264 29.6405 36.6636 48.8271
2 0.0227 24.7193 27.0157 30.8379 34.3969 41.5326 50.9536 67.3029
2.5 0.0062 32.3794 35.2750 40.0795 44.5463 53.5396 65.4060 86.0823
3 0.0013 40.0894 43.5764 49.3943 54.7751 65.6627 80.0245 105.1112
3.5 0.0002 47.8573 51.9459 58.7712 65.1041 77.9030 94.8266 124.4492
4 0.0000 55.6561 60.3736 68.2104 75.5167 90.2615 109.7971 144.0499
Table .19: BARC
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0088 0.0094 0.0103 0.0114 0.0132 0.0152 0.0186
1 0.1586 9.0793 10.3792 12.3784 14.8478 18.6943 23.1703 30.7423
1.5 0.0668 18.6081 20.5521 23.5605 27.2884 33.0925 39.8189 51.1909
2 0.0227 28.2026 30.8166 34.8354 39.7971 47.5611 56.5984 71.8303
2.5 0.0062 37.8272 41.0917 46.1373 52.3948 62.1336 73.4941 92.6622
3 0.0013 47.4922 51.4466 57.5255 65.0292 76.8190 90.5065 113.6884
3.5 0.0002 57.2135 61.8250 68.9483 77.7860 91.5762 107.6621 134.9108
4 0.0000 66.9496 72.2711 80.4510 90.5755 106.4430 124.9643 156.3312
Table .20: HSBC
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0136 0.0150 0.0179 0.0203 0.0227 0.0278 0.0466
1 0.1586 20.5801 23.7576 30.4072 36.0103 41.6315 53.4408 98.6934
1.5 0.0668 36.1350 40.8833 50.9033 59.3394 67.8220 85.5670 153.9037
2 0.0227 51.8031 58.1764 71.5818 82.9071 94.3082 118.1886 210.4330
2.5 0.0062 67.5560 75.5911 92.4443 106.7159 121.0933 151.2409 268.3055
3 0.0013 83.4250 93.1234 113.4922 130.7684 148.1806 184.7499 327.5148
3.5 0.0002 99.4222 110.7739 134.7272 155.0669 175.5736 218.7548 388.1364
4 0.0000 115.5058 128.5936 156.1646 179.6141 203.2757 253.1980 450.2007
Table .21: RBS
=0:05 =0:20 =0:35 =0:50 =0:65 =0:80 =0:95
 p() 0.0111 0.0122 0.0130 0.0141 0.0156 0.0176 0.0219
1 0.1586 17.0341 20.0380 22.2071 24.9972 29.1690 34.3792 46.0806
1.5 0.0668 31.5986 36.1323 39.4049 43.6132 49.8983 57.6948 75.3085
2 0.0227 46.2820 52.3152 56.6834 62.3382 70.7817 81.2206 104.8566
2.5 0.0062 61.0223 68.6308 74.1215 81.1805 91.8171 104.9751 134.7283
3 0.0013 75.8533 85.0064 91.6559 100.2041 113.0055 128.9362 164.9395
3.5 0.0002 90.7716 101.5162 109.2725 119.3392 134.3661 153.1056 195.4966
4 0.0000 105.7516 118.1173 127.0630 138.5860 155.9230 177.4850 226.3885
45